Assurance and Reassurance: The Role of the Board

Paper prepared for the Conference on Corporate Boards: Managers of Risk, Sources of Risk, Center for Integrated Risk Management and Corporate Governance, Loyola University, Chicago, IL, April 16-17, 2008.

In Robert W. Kolb & Donald Schwartz, eds., CORPORATE BOARDS: MANAGERS OF RISK, SOURCES OF RISK (Blackwell Publishing, 2009).

32 Pages Posted: 4 Oct 2008 Last revised: 28 Jan 2020

Date Written: October 3, 2008

Abstract

This paper argues that the central function of the board of directors is, and has always been, to provide assurance, and reassurance. The paper introduces a typology of four classes of board functions, legal, normative, descriptive, and utilitarian, and argues that none adequately captures the key function of the board, assurance. Not only is assurance at the heart of modern corporate governance; it has always been there, and, indeed, must be there because of a basic problem in organizational design, what I call the Governance Paradox (GP). One method of managing the Governance Paradox is to create pantheonic directorates. In order to understand the fundamental nature of my claim that what the board is all about is assurance, I then review the functioning of the very first joint-stock company of modern form, the Russia or Muscovy Company of Tudor England. I conclude by briefly arguing the utility of reconceptualizing the assurance problems of corporate governance in terms of an agent capitalism model of the firm.

Keywords: boards of directors, agency theory, assurance, corporate governance, collective action, heroes, prestige systems, certification contests, testaments

JEL Classification: A14, D21, D23, D63, D71, D72, D78, D83, G30, G34, K22, L22, M13

Suggested Citation

Mitnick, Barry M., Assurance and Reassurance: The Role of the Board (October 3, 2008). Paper prepared for the Conference on Corporate Boards: Managers of Risk, Sources of Risk, Center for Integrated Risk Management and Corporate Governance, Loyola University, Chicago, IL, April 16-17, 2008. . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1278110

Barry M. Mitnick (Contact Author)

University of Pittsburgh ( email )

Katz Graduate School of Business
261 Mervis Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States
412 648-1555 (Phone)

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