Vertical Mergers

ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY, Vol. 2, p. 1455, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2008

47 Pages Posted: 8 Oct 2008 Last revised: 11 Oct 2008

Jeffrey Church

University of Calgary - Department of Economics

Date Written: 2008

Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of the economics of vertical mergers. The overview strongly supports, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, a presumption that vertical mergers are welfare enhancing and good for consumers. However, vertical mergers can be anticompetitive if they result in either foreclosure or enhanced coordination. The difficult challenge for enforcement policy is effectively distinguishing between anticompetitive and procompetitive transactions. The economics of vertical mergers can provide a basis for this distinction and thus inform optimal enforcement policy and the nature of vertical merger enforcement guidelines.

Keywords: Vertical Merger

JEL Classification: L40

Suggested Citation

Church, Jeffrey, Vertical Mergers (2008). ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY, Vol. 2, p. 1455, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2008 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1280505

Jeffrey Church (Contact Author)

University of Calgary - Department of Economics ( email )

2500 University Drive, NW
Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4
Canada

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