Convergence of Double Auctions to Pareto Optimal Allocations in the Edgeworth Box

25 Pages Posted: 8 Oct 2008

See all articles by Dhananjay (Dan) K. Gode

Dhananjay (Dan) K. Gode

New York University (NYU) - Department of Accounting

Stephen Spear

Carnegie Mellon University - Financial Economics

Shyam Sunder

Yale University - School of Management; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2004

Abstract

Double auctions with profit-motivated human traders as well as "zero-intelligence" programmed traders have previously been shown to converge to Pareto optimal allocations in partial equilibrium settings. We show that these results remain robust in two-good general equilibrium settings and elucidate how market structure, not optimization by traders, guides efficient resource allocation.

Keywords: Pareto optimal allocations, Edgeworth Box, Double auction, Zero-intelligence traders

Suggested Citation

Gode, Dhananjay (Dan) K. and Spear, Stephen E. and Sunder, Shyam, Convergence of Double Auctions to Pareto Optimal Allocations in the Edgeworth Box (May 2004). NYU Working Paper No. DHANANJAY (DAN) K. GODE-09. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1280707

Dhananjay (Dan) K. Gode (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Department of Accounting ( email )

40 West 4th Street
Suite 10-180
New York, NY 10012
United States
212-998-0021 (Phone)
212-995-4004 (Fax)

Stephen E. Spear

Carnegie Mellon University - Financial Economics ( email )

GSIA
Schenley Park
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
United States

Shyam Sunder

Yale University - School of Management ( email )

165 Whitney Avenue
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States
203-432-6160 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/sunder/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
116
Abstract Views
1,467
rank
73,484
PlumX Metrics