40 Pages Posted: 15 Oct 2008
Date Written: September 9, 2008
Settlement agreements that require a plaintiff not to disclose or publicize any information about her claim are both common and controversial. Under some conditions, however, a mass tort defendant will rationally choose to discourage such secrecy. A defendant can use publicity to act as a commitment device akin to a most-favored-nation agreement to increase its bargaining power with plaintiffs. The paper uses the real world example of Bayer's cerivastatin litigation as a case study to illustrate this theory in practice and to explore the public policy implications of this finding.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Anderson, James M., Understanding Mass Tort Defendant Incentives for Confidential Settlements: Lessons from Bayer's Cerivastatin Litigation Strategy (September 9, 2008). RAND Working Paper Series No. WR- 617-ICJ; U. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1281626 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1281626