A Note on Optimal Allocation Mechanisms

10 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2008

See all articles by Nicolás Figueroa

Nicolás Figueroa

University of Chile

Vasiliki Skreta

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics; University College London

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2008

Abstract

This paper studies revenue-maximizing allocation mechanisms for multiple goods where the buyerís utility can depend non-linearly in his type. We point out that despite strictly increasing virtual utilities, the allocation rule obtained via pointwise optimization may fail to be increasing and thus it may violate incentive compatibility. More importantly, the revenue maximizing allocation may involve randomizations between di§erent allocations.

Keywords: mechanism design, optimal auctions, bunching

Suggested Citation

Figueroa, Nicolás and Skreta, Vasiliki, A Note on Optimal Allocation Mechanisms (April 2008). NYU Working Paper No. 2451/26022, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1281905

Nicolás Figueroa

University of Chile ( email )

Pío Nono Nº1, Providencia
Santiago, R. Metropolitana 7520421
Chile

Vasiliki Skreta (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States

HOME PAGE: http://vskreta.wixsite.com/vskreta

University College London ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://vskreta.wixsite.com/vskreta

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
22
Abstract Views
359
PlumX Metrics