Optimal Auctions with General Distribution

16 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2008

See all articles by Vasiliki Skreta

Vasiliki Skreta

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics; University College London

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2007


This note characterizes revenue maximizing auctions in a single unit independentprivate value environment when buyers distributions of valuations can be discrete, continuous, or any mixture of the two possibilities. The procedure described is applicable to many other single or multi- agent mechanism design problems with transferable utility and single-dimensional types.

Keywords: mechanism design, optimal auctions, ironing, Dirac s delta functions

Suggested Citation

Skreta, Vasiliki, Optimal Auctions with General Distribution (October 2007). NYU Working Paper No. 2451/26024, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1281907

Vasiliki Skreta (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States

HOME PAGE: http://vskreta.wixsite.com/vskreta

University College London ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://vskreta.wixsite.com/vskreta

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