Properties of Scoring Auctions

25 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2008

See all articles by John Asker

John Asker

UCLA

Estelle Cantillon

Free University of Brussels (VUB/ULB) - ECARES; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Date Written: August 2006

Abstract

This paper studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of non monetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions when suppliers private information is multidimensional (characterization of equilibrium behavior and expected utility equivalence). In addition, we show that scoring auctions dominate several other commonly used procedures for buying differentiated products, including menu auctions, beauty contests and price-only auctions with minimum quality thresholds.

Suggested Citation

Asker, John William and Cantillon, Estelle, Properties of Scoring Auctions (August 2006). NYU Working Paper No. 2451/26084, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1281966

John William Asker (Contact Author)

UCLA ( email )

8283 Bunche Hall
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477
United States

Estelle Cantillon

Free University of Brussels (VUB/ULB) - ECARES ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
+32 2 650 3840 (Phone)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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