Does Temporary Affirmative Action Produce Persistent Effects? A Study of Black and Female Employment in Law Enforcement

35 Pages Posted: 14 Oct 2008 Last revised: 22 Sep 2011

See all articles by Amalia R. Miller

Amalia R. Miller

University of Virginia - Department of Economics

Carmit Segal

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 1, 2010

Abstract

This paper exploits variation in timing and outcomes of employment discrimination lawsuits against US law enforcement agencies to estimate the cumulative employment effects of temporary, externally-imposed affirmative action (AA). To estimate persistent effects, we focus on AA termination, but we also establish new results regarding AA initiation. Using administrative data we show that relative to national trends AA increases black employment at all ranks by between 4.5 and 6.2 percentage points. We find no erosion of these employment gains in the fifteen years following AA termination. Nevertheless, we find a significant decrease in black employment growth following AA termination relative to growth in departments whose plans continue. In contrast, we only find marginal employment gains for women at lower ranks.

Keywords: affirmative action, employment discrimination litigation, law enforcement

JEL Classification: J78, J45, K31

Suggested Citation

Miller, Amalia R. and Segal, Carmit, Does Temporary Affirmative Action Produce Persistent Effects? A Study of Black and Female Employment in Law Enforcement (June 1, 2010). Review of Economics and Statistics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1282313

Amalia R. Miller (Contact Author)

University of Virginia - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 400182
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4182
United States

HOME PAGE: http://people.virginia.edu/~am5by/

Carmit Segal

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Winterthurerstrasse 30
Z├╝rich, CH-8006
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/carmitsegal/

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