Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination: Large-Scale Experimental Evidence

45 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2008

See all articles by Francesco Feri

Francesco Feri

University of London

Bernd Irlenbusch

London School of Economics & Political Science - Department of Management; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Matthias Sutter

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; University of Cologne - Department of Economics

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Abstract

The need for efficient coordination is ubiquitous in organizations and industries. The literature on the determinants of efficient coordination has focused on individual decision-making so far. In reality, however, teams often have to coordinate with other teams. We present an experiment with 825 participants, using six different coordination games, where either individuals or teams interact with each other. We find that teams coordinate much more efficiently than individuals. This finding adds one important cornerstone to the recent literature on the conditions for successful coordination. We explain the differences between individuals and teams using the experience weighted attraction learning model.

Keywords: coordination games, individual decision-making, team decision-making, experience-weighted attraction learning, experiment

JEL Classification: C71, C91, C92

Suggested Citation

Feri, Francesco and Irlenbusch, Bernd and Sutter, Matthias, Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination: Large-Scale Experimental Evidence. IZA Discussion Paper No. 3741. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1282963 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0042-7092.2007.00700.x

Francesco Feri (Contact Author)

University of London ( email )

Senate House
Malet Street
London, WC1E 7HU
United Kingdom

Bernd Irlenbusch

London School of Economics & Political Science - Department of Management ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 7955 7840 (Phone)
+44 (0)20 7955 6887 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/management/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Matthias Sutter

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

University of Cologne - Department of Economics

Cologne, 50923
Germany

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