Compromise Reaching Mechanisms in Multi-Group/Multi-Player Negotiation Processes

29 Pages Posted: 15 Oct 2008

See all articles by Shimon Schocken

Shimon Schocken

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Robert A. Hummel

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: June 1993

Abstract

We consider a situation in which multiple decision-makers who are partitionedinto two or more distinct groups are asked to recommend a uniform course ofaction which is drawn from a finite and explicit set of potential alternatives.We present group-level and player-level mechanisms to reach a compromisedecision under such circumstances. The group-level mechanism is based onthe Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence; The player-level mechanism employsa set-product operation that aggregates the individual decisions over a certainspace of committees. Previous research established that the two mechanisms areisomorphic, which, in the contest of the present paper, implies that they yieldthe same compromise decision. However, unlike the Dempster-Shafer theory,which was criticized for lack of external validity, the set-product mechanismhas plausible properties in the contest of group decision making. With that inmind, the paper seeks to (i) report about an interesting relationship betweengroup decision research and AI methods to manage uncertainty, and (ii) builda foundation for an inter-disciplinary research that exploits this linkage.

Suggested Citation

Schocken, Shimon and Hummel, Robert A., Compromise Reaching Mechanisms in Multi-Group/Multi-Player Negotiation Processes (June 1993). NYU Working Paper No. 2451/14250, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1284871

Shimon Schocken (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Robert A. Hummel

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
22
Abstract Views
311
PlumX Metrics