Transparency and Bypass in Electronic Financial Markets

23 Pages Posted: 15 Oct 2008

See all articles by Bruce W. Weber

Bruce W. Weber

City University of New York (CUNY) - Baruch College

Date Written: June 1993

Abstract

Electronic markets use information technology to disseminate information onprices, quantities, and buyer and supplier identities. In spite of the recognizedbenefits of electronic markets, increased visibility and transparency may introduceimperfections, and create profitable opportunities to bypass markets that generatesthe information. In the U.S. securities markets, dissemination of market data hasequipped several firms to develop competing, off-exchange trading mechanismsthat rely on market price data, but whose transactions bypass the establishedmarket. Concern is rising that the growing volume of trading occurring awayfrom the main market may reduce liquidity, and increase transactions costs. Asimulation model of securities trading in a continuous auction market (similar tothe market structure of the New York Stock Exchange) is used to examine themarket quality effects of increasing levels of trading activity through an off-exchangedealer. Market characteristics, such as transactions costs, are measuredas off-exchange trading increases from zero percent to 20 percent of the totaltrading volume. The results indicate that competition from an alternative tradingvenue reduces some trading costs borne by investors. Contrary to regulatorygoals, however, off-market trading expands the role of profit-seeking dealers, andlowers the probability that some investors' orders will execute.

Suggested Citation

Weber, Bruce W., Transparency and Bypass in Electronic Financial Markets (June 1993). NYU Working Paper No. 2451/14251, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1284872

Bruce W. Weber (Contact Author)

City University of New York (CUNY) - Baruch College

17 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10010
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
30
Abstract Views
488
PlumX Metrics