Dworkin on the Value of Integrity
Deakin Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 167-180, 2007
University of Queensland TC Beirne School of Law Research Paper No. 08-14
15 Pages Posted: 20 Oct 2008
Date Written: October 20, 2008
Abstract
This article explores and critiques Ronald Dworkin's arguments on the value of integrity in law. Dworkin presents integrity in both legislation and adjudication as holding inherent political value. I defend an alternative theory of the value of integrity, according to which integrity holds instrumental value as part of a legal framework that seeks to realise a particular set of basic values taken to underpin the legal system as a whole. It is argued that this instrumental-value theory explains the value of integrity more satisfactorily than Dworkin's inherent-value account. The article concludes with a discussion of Dworkin's 'one right answer thesis'. Although the proposed theory of integrity does not support a strong version of Dworkin's thesis, it does suggest that there will be a single correct answer to legal questions more often than for normative deliberation generally.
Keywords: Integrity, law and ethics, legal reasoning, basic values, Dworkin, Finnis
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