Corporate Control and Majority Positions

Cuadernos Economicos de ICE, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 175-201, 1992

Posted: 1 Dec 2008

See all articles by David A. Hirshleifer

David A. Hirshleifer

University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business; NBER

Abstract

This essay addresses some salient issues associated with corporate control. First, what determines the distribution of insider and outsider share ownership in the firm, and how does this distribution affect corporate performance? Second, how effective are board dismissals, proxy fights and takeovers as alternative corporate control mechanisms? Third, how do these alternative mechanisms interact, and what are the resulting incentives for boards of directors, managers, and takeover bidders? Fourth, do takeovers change underlying value, or do they merely redistribute wealth between affected parties? Finally, what explains the changes in supervision by boards of directors and through takeovers that occur over time?

Suggested Citation

Hirshleifer, David A., Corporate Control and Majority Positions. Cuadernos Economicos de ICE, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 175-201, 1992. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1287729

David A. Hirshleifer (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business ( email )

Irvine, CA California 92697-3125
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.uci.edu/dhirshle/

NBER ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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