Security Analysis and Trading Patterns When Some Investors Receive Information Before Others

Journal of Finance, Vol. 49, No. 5, pp. 1665-1698, December 1994

Posted: 1 Dec 2008

See all articles by Avanidhar Subrahmanyam

Avanidhar Subrahmanyam

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area; Institute of Global Finance, UNSW Business School; Financial Research Network (FIRN)

Sheridan Titman

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

David A. Hirshleifer

University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business; NBER

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Abstract

In existing models of information acquisition, all informed investors receive their information at the same time. This article analyzes trading behavior and equilibrium information acquisition when some investors receive common private information before others. The model implies that, under some conditions, investors will focus only on a subset of securities ("herding"), while neglecting other securities with identical exogenous characteristics. In addition, the model is consistent with empirical correlations that are suggestive of oft-cited trading strategies such as profit taking (short-term position reversal) and following the leader (mimicking earlier trades).

Suggested Citation

Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar and Titman, Sheridan and Hirshleifer, David A., Security Analysis and Trading Patterns When Some Investors Receive Information Before Others. Journal of Finance, Vol. 49, No. 5, pp. 1665-1698, December 1994. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1287764

Avanidhar Subrahmanyam

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area ( email )

Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
310-825-5355 (Phone)
310-206-5455 (Fax)

Institute of Global Finance, UNSW Business School

Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

Financial Research Network (FIRN)

C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia

Sheridan Titman

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance ( email )

Red McCombs School of Business
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-232-2787 (Phone)
512-471-5073 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

David A. Hirshleifer (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business ( email )

Irvine, CA California 92697-3125
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.uci.edu/dhirshle/

NBER ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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