Financial Accounting Standards Setting: A Social Science Perspective

Advances in Accounting, Vol. 5 (Lead Article), p. 3-14, 1987

Posted: 22 Oct 2008 Last revised: 20 Feb 2018

See all articles by Ehsan H. Feroz

Ehsan H. Feroz

University of Washington, Milgard School of Business-Accounting ; University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Government of the United States of America - US GAO Advisory Council; University of Minnesota, Labovitz School of Business-Department of Accounting; University of Minnesota, Carlson School of Management-Department of Accounting; American Accounting Association

Date Written: October 21, 2008

Abstract

This paper draws on the group theory to derive some predictions regarding interest group participation in financial accounting setting. Out of the total spectrum of groups that can be potentially affected by accounting standards, only those who foresee large benefits from securing preferred accounting rules are expected to lobby the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Further, lobbying is likely to be industry specific rather than being overly general or gratuitous. Finally, group success in lobbying FASB might be inversely related to the size of the group.

Keywords: Financial Accounting, Accounting Standards Setting, FASB, Lobby, Interest Groups, Self-Regulation, Political Economy

JEL Classification: M41

Suggested Citation

Feroz, Ehsan H., Financial Accounting Standards Setting: A Social Science Perspective (October 21, 2008). Advances in Accounting, Vol. 5 (Lead Article), p. 3-14, 1987, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1287962

Ehsan H. Feroz (Contact Author)

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