Uniqueness in Random-Proposer Multilateral Bargaining

42 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2008

See all articles by Huibin Yan

Huibin Yan

University of California, Santa Cruz

Date Written: July 2005

Abstract

Solution uniqueness is an important property for a bargaining model. Rubinstein's (1982) seminal 2-person alternating-offer bargaining game has a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium outcome. Is it possible to obtain uniqueness results in the much enlarged setting of multilateral bargaining with a characteristic function? In an exploratory effort, this paper investigates a model first proposed in Okada (1993) in which each period players have equal probabilities of being selected to make a proposal and bargaining ends after one coalition forms. Focusing on transferable utility environments and Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SSPE), we find ex ante SSPE payoff uniqueness for large classes of characteristic functions. This study includes as a special case a variant of the legislative bargaining model in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), and our results imply (unrestricted) SSPE payoff uniqueness in this case.

Keywords: random-proposer, multilateral bargaining, unique, coalition

JEL Classification: C72

Suggested Citation

Yan, Huibin, Uniqueness in Random-Proposer Multilateral Bargaining (July 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1288176 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1288176

Huibin Yan (Contact Author)

University of California, Santa Cruz ( email )

1156 High St
Santa Cruz, CA 95064
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
58
Abstract Views
505
rank
447,637
PlumX Metrics