20 Pages Posted: 27 Oct 2008 Last revised: 4 Dec 2013
Date Written: October 23, 2008
The paper returns to the question whether equality in distribution is valuable in itself, or, if you like, whether it is intrinsically valuable. Its bulk is an examination of two familiar arguments against the intrinsic value of distributional equality: the levelling down objection and the objection that equality violates some person-affecting condition, in that its realisation does not improve the lot of people.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Raz, Joseph, On the Value of Distributional Equality (October 23, 2008). Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 41/2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1288545 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1288545
By Re'em Segev