47 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2008
Date Written: October 1, 2006
Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a "double coincidence of wants." Developing infrastructure to perform 3-way as well as 2-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be arranged. Larger than 3-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types.
JEL Classification: JEL C78, D02, D51, D78, I10
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Roth, Alvin E. and Sonmez, Tayfun and Ünver, M. Utku, Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences (October 1, 2006). American Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 3, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1290350