Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences

47 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2008

See all articles by Alvin E. Roth

Alvin E. Roth

Dept. of Economics, Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Tayfun Sonmez

Boston College - Department of Economics

M. Utku Ünver

Boston College, Department of Economics

Date Written: October 1, 2006

Abstract

Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a "double coincidence of wants." Developing infrastructure to perform 3-way as well as 2-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be arranged. Larger than 3-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types.

JEL Classification: JEL C78, D02, D51, D78, I10

Suggested Citation

Roth, Alvin E. and Sonmez, Tayfun Oguz and Unver, Utku, Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences (October 1, 2006). American Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 3, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1290350

Alvin E. Roth

Dept. of Economics, Stanford University ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
STANFORD, CA 94305-6072
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Tayfun Oguz Sonmez

Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

Utku Unver (Contact Author)

Boston College, Department of Economics ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
6175640771 (Phone)
+1 (617) 552 2318 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www2.bc.edu/~unver

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