Designing Incentives Regulation for the Environment

56 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2008

See all articles by Michael G. Faure

Michael G. Faure

University of Maastricht - Faculty of Law, Metro; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law

Date Written: October 27, 2008

Abstract

This paper provides an overview of legal and policy instruments that can be used to provide potential polluters with incentives for pollution abatement. Traditional law and economics literature as well as environmental economics are used to show how liability rules, safety regulation, environmental taxation and emission trading all have specific advantages and disadvantages. It is therefore that environmental policy should look for optimal combinations (mixes) of a variety of policy instruments argue.

Keywords: environmental policy, liability rules, environmental taxation, emission trading, regulation, command and control, interest groups

JEL Classification: K32, K13, Q50

Suggested Citation

Faure, Michael G., Designing Incentives Regulation for the Environment (October 27, 2008). Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 2008-7. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1290523 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1290523

Michael G. Faure (Contact Author)

University of Maastricht - Faculty of Law, Metro ( email )

PO Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands
+31 - 43 - 388 30 60 (Phone)
+31 - 43 - 325 90 91 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.michaelfaure.be

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law ( email )

3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

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