43 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2008
Date Written: December 2006
We examine how different economies would design an optimal corporate governancesystem structured from three of the main mechanisms of corporate governance (managerial ownership, monitoring by banks, and disciplining by the takeover market). We allow for interactions among the mechanisms. The first set of results characterizes the combination of governance mechanisms that can appear in any optimally designed structure: 1) when monitored debt appears in an optimal system it is accompanied by concentrated ownership, and 2) when takeovers appear in an optimal system they are accompanied by diffuse ownership. We show that out of the numerous governance structures that could arise from combinations of the governancemechanisms, only three are candidates for an optimal system. These three endogenously derived governance structures match the prevalent systems (family based, bank based and market based) in the world. The optimal system for a given economy is characterized as a function of the degrees of development of its financial institutions and markets. Our analysis yields several testableimplications.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
John, Kose and Kedia, Simi, Design of Corporate Governance: Role of Ownership Structure, Takeovers, and Bank Debt (December 2006). NYU Working Paper No. CLB-06-023. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1291611