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Has Collusion Returned to Baseball? Analyzing Whether a Concerted Increase in Free Agent Player Supply Would Violate Baseball's "Collusion Clause"

Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 24, p. 59, 2004

26 Pages Posted: 30 Oct 2008 Last revised: 28 Apr 2009

Marc Edelman

City University of New York - Baruch College, Zicklin School of Business; Fordham University School of Law

Date Written: Fall 2004

Abstract

This article argues that a concerted agreement among baseball clubs to increase the supply of free agent players violates baseball's collusion clause, and therefore, MLB clubs are at risk of losing another collusion grievance. Part I of this article explains the evolution of baseball's collusion clause and discusses three past collusion grievances filed by the MLBPA in the 1980s. Part II explains baseball's collusion-free period, which began with the settlement of 1980s collusion disputes. Part III discusses why MLB clubs may have again violated the "collusion clause" in the 2002-03 off-season.

Keywords: baseball, Major League Baseball, collusion, labor, antitrust, sports, sports law, sports economics

Suggested Citation

Edelman, Marc, Has Collusion Returned to Baseball? Analyzing Whether a Concerted Increase in Free Agent Player Supply Would Violate Baseball's "Collusion Clause" (Fall 2004). Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 24, p. 59, 2004 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1291886

Marc Edelman (Contact Author)

City University of New York - Baruch College, Zicklin School of Business ( email )

One Bernard Baruch Way
Box B9-220
New York, NY 10010
United States

Fordham University School of Law ( email )

140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States

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