High-Speed Rail & Air Transport Competition: Game Engineering as Tool for Cost-Benefit Analysis

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 08-103/3

42 Pages Posted: 24 Nov 2008 Last revised: 9 Feb 2009

See all articles by Nicole Adler

Nicole Adler

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Chris Nash

Leeds University Business School (LUBS) - Division of Economics

Eric A. J. H. Pels

Vrije Universiteit - Department of Spatial Economic

Date Written: October 31, 2008

Abstract

This paper develops a methodology to assess transport infrastructure investments and their effects on a Nash equilibria taking into account competition between multiple privatized transport operator types. The operators, including high-speed rail, hub and spoke legacy airlines and low cost carriers, maximize profit functions via prices, frequency and train/plane sizes, given infrastructure provision and costs and environmental charges. The methodology is subsequently applied to all 27 European Union countries, specifically analyzing four of the prioritized Trans-European Networks.

Keywords: airlines, high-speed rail, networks, applied game theory, infrastructure pricing

JEL Classification: R40, L92, L93

Suggested Citation

Adler, Nicole and Nash, Chris and Pels, Eric A.J.H., High-Speed Rail & Air Transport Competition: Game Engineering as Tool for Cost-Benefit Analysis (October 31, 2008). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 08-103/3, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1292745 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1292745

Nicole Adler (Contact Author)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91905
Israel

Chris Nash

Leeds University Business School (LUBS) - Division of Economics ( email )

Leeds LS2 9JT
United Kingdom

Eric A.J.H. Pels

Vrije Universiteit - Department of Spatial Economic ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081HV Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31-20-4446049 (Phone)
+31-20-4446004 (Fax)

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