Collusion Via Signalling in Open Ascending Auctions with Multiple Objects and Complementarities

28 Pages Posted: 3 Nov 2008

See all articles by Sandro Brusco

Sandro Brusco

SUNY at Stony Brook University, College of Arts and Science, Department of Economics

Giuseppe Lopomo

Fuqua School - Duke University; Duke University - Department of Economics

Date Written: April 1999

Abstract

Collusive equilibria exist in open ascending auctions with multiple objects, if the number of the bidders is sufficiently small relative to the number of objects, even with large complementarities in the buyers' utility function. The bidders collude by dividing the objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Hence the complementarities are not realized.

Suggested Citation

Brusco, Sandro and Lopomo, Giuseppe, Collusion Via Signalling in Open Ascending Auctions with Multiple Objects and Complementarities (April 1999). NYU Working Paper No. EC-99-05. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1293087

Sandro Brusco (Contact Author)

SUNY at Stony Brook University, College of Arts and Science, Department of Economics ( email )

Stony Brook, NY 11794
United States

Giuseppe Lopomo

Fuqua School - Duke University ( email )

Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0097
United States
(919) 660-7820 (Phone)
(919) 660-7971 (Fax)

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

213 Social Sciences Building
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
32
Abstract Views
383
PlumX Metrics