Schmitt's Critique of Kelsenian Normativism

16 Pages Posted: 2 Nov 2008

See all articles by Sylvie Delacroix

Sylvie Delacroix

University of Birmingham - Birmingham Law School; The Alan Turing Institute

Date Written: March 1, 2005

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to underline the relevance of Schmitt's critique of Kelsenian normativism in the context of today's debate about the status of legal positivism. Schmitt's underlining of the limits which a certain kind of positivism imposes upon itself highlights a contemporary issue about what legal theory should aim at when accounting for the normative dimension of law. Schmitt's ultimate failure to take up the theoretical challenge he himself raised (with its well-known consequences) is deemed to illustrate-negatively-the importance of providing a plausible account of the social practices which bring law into existence.

Keywords: Carl Schmitt, Kelsen, normativity, Weimar, decisionism

Suggested Citation

Delacroix, Sylvie, Schmitt's Critique of Kelsenian Normativism (March 1, 2005). Ratio Juris, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 30-45, March 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1293216

Sylvie Delacroix (Contact Author)

University of Birmingham - Birmingham Law School ( email )

Edgbaston
Birmingham, AL B15 2TT
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/law/delacroix-sylvie.aspx

The Alan Turing Institute ( email )

96 Euston Road
London, NW1 2DB
United Kingdom

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