Hart's and Kelsen's Concepts of Normativity Contrasted

20 Pages Posted: 2 Nov 2008

See all articles by Sylvie Delacroix

Sylvie Delacroix

University of Birmingham - Birmingham Law School; The Alan Turing Institute

Date Written: December 1, 2004


Hart's and Kelsen's respective outlooks on the concept of normativity not only differ by the way they explain this concept but also, more importantly, in what they seek to achieve when endeavouring to account for the normative dimension of law. By examining Hart's and Kelsen's models in the light of Korsgaard's understanding of the "normativity problem," my aim is to emphasise not only their contrasted perspectives, but also the common limit they impose on their theories by dismissing as inappropriate any question regarding the emergence of legal normativity. On the basis of my previous arguments, I shall explain why I deem Raz's analysis of the contrast between Hart's and Kelsen's conceptions of normativity to be misleading.

Keywords: Hart, Kelsen, normativity, Raz, detached point of view, Korsgaard

Suggested Citation

Delacroix, Sylvie, Hart's and Kelsen's Concepts of Normativity Contrasted (December 1, 2004). Ratio Juris, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 501-520, December 2004, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1293245

Sylvie Delacroix (Contact Author)

University of Birmingham - Birmingham Law School ( email )

Birmingham, AL B15 2TT
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/law/delacroix-sylvie.aspx

The Alan Turing Institute ( email )

96 Euston Road
London, NW1 2DB
United Kingdom

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