Institutions, Social Norms, and Bargaining Power: An Analysis of Individual Leisure Time in Couple Households

39 Pages Posted: 3 Nov 2008

See all articles by Leslie S. Stratton

Leslie S. Stratton

Virginia Commonwealth University - School of Business - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Nabanita Datta Gupta

Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

We exploit time use data from Denmark and the United States to examine the impact institutions and social norms have on individuals' bargaining power within a household, hypothesizing that the more generous social welfare system and more egalitarian social norms in Denmark will mitigate the impact standard economic power measures have upon couples' time use. Further we posit that leisure time will be more sensitive to power considerations than housework time which may be more influenced by preferences regarding household public goods, to gendered notions of time use, and to censoring. Our results are generally supportive of these hypotheses, with leisure time on non-work days in the US being particularly responsive to economic power. In addition, we find some evidence that institutions matter as women in the US who are more likely to receive welfare benefits enjoy more leisure time than would be suggested by their economic power alone.

Keywords: time use, power, leisure, institutions, norms

JEL Classification: J22

Suggested Citation

Stratton, Leslie S. and Datta Gupta, Nabanita, Institutions, Social Norms, and Bargaining Power: An Analysis of Individual Leisure Time in Couple Households. IZA Discussion Paper No. 3773, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1293545 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0042-7092.2007.00700.x

Leslie S. Stratton (Contact Author)

Virginia Commonwealth University - School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 844000
Richmond, VA 23284-4000
United States
804-828-7141 (Phone)
804-828-1719 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Nabanita Datta Gupta

Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University ( email )

Fuglesangs Allé 4
8210 Aarhus V
Denmark
+45 87165207 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://pure.au.dk/portal/da/ndg@econ.au.dk

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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