Does Corporate Governance Matter in Competitive Industries?

Abstract

By reducing the fear of a hostile takeover, business combination (BC) laws weaken corporate governance and create more opportunity for managerial slack. Using the passage of BC laws as a source of identifying variation, we examine if such laws have a different effect on firms in competitive and non-competitive industries. We find that while firms in non-competitive industries experience a substantial drop in operating performance, firms in competitive industries experience virtually no effect. Though consistent with the general notion that competition mitigates managerial agency problems, our results are, in particular,supportive of the stronger Alchian-Friedman-Stigler hypothesis that managerial slack cannot exist, or survive, in competitive industries. When we examine which agency problem competition mitigates, we find evidence in favor of a â¬Squiet-lifeâ¬? hypothesis. While capital expenditures are unaffected by the passage of BC laws, input costs, wages, and overhead costs all increase, and only so in non-competitive industries. We also conduct event studiesaround the dates of the first newspaper reports about the BC laws. We find that while firms in non-competitive industries experience a significant decline in their stock prices, firms in competitive industries experience a small and insignificant price impact.