Conflicts of Interest in Sell-Side Research and the Moderating Role of Institutional Investors

48 Pages Posted: 3 Nov 2008

See all articles by Alexander Ljungqvist

Alexander Ljungqvist

Stockholm School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Felicia C. Marston

University of Virginia - McIntire School of Commerce

Laura T. Starks

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance

Kelsey D. Wei

University of Texas at Dallas

Hong Yan

Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) - Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance (SAIF)

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2005

Abstract

Because sell-side analysts are dependent on institutional investors for performance ratings and trading commissions, we argue that analysts are less likely to succumb to investment banking or brokerage pressure in stocks highly visible to institutional investors. Examining a comprehensivesample of analyst recommendations over the 1994-2000 period, we find that analysts recommendations relative to consensus are positively associated with investment bankingrelationships and brokerage pressure, but negatively associated with the presence of institutional investor owners. The presence of institutional investors is also associated with more accurate earnings forecasts and more timely re-ratings following severe share price falls.

Keywords: Analyst recommendations, Analyst forecast accuracy, Investment banking, Banking Relationships

Suggested Citation

Ljungqvist, Alexander and Marston, Felicia C. and Starks, Laura T. and Wei, Kelsey D. and Yan, Hong, Conflicts of Interest in Sell-Side Research and the Moderating Role of Institutional Investors (January 2005). NYU Working Paper No. FIN-05-013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1294149

Alexander Ljungqvist (Contact Author)

Stockholm School of Economics ( email )

111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Felicia C. Marston

University of Virginia - McIntire School of Commerce ( email )

P.O. Box 400173
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4173
United States
804-924-1417 (Phone)

Laura T. Starks

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance ( email )

Red McCombs School of Business
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-471-5899 (Phone)
512-471-5073 (Fax)

Kelsey D. Wei

University of Texas at Dallas ( email )

P.O. Box 830688
Richardson, TX 75083-0688
United States
9728835978 (Phone)

Hong Yan

Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) - Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance (SAIF) ( email )

Shanghai Jiao Tong University
211 West Huaihai Road
Shanghai, 200030
China

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