Leaning Against the Wind

67 Pages Posted: 3 Nov 2008

See all articles by Pierre-Olivier Weill

Pierre-Olivier Weill

University of California, Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2005

Abstract

During financial disruptions, market makers provide liquidity by absorbing external selling pressure. They buy when the pressure is large, accumulate inventories, and sell when the pressure alleviates. This paper studies optimal dynamic liquidity provision in a theoretical market setting with large and temporary selling pressure, and order-execution delays. I show that competitive market makers offer the socially optimal amount of liquidity, provided they have access to sufficient capital. If raising capital is costly, this suggests a policy role for lenient central bank lending during financial disruptions.

Keywords: Market making capital, market maker inventory management

Suggested Citation

Weill, Pierre-Olivier, Leaning Against the Wind (February 2005). NYU Working Paper No. FIN-05-017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1294153

Pierre-Olivier Weill (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles ( email )

Box 951477
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
51
Abstract Views
1,028
rank
203,310
PlumX Metrics