Limit Orders and Volatility in a Hybrid Market: The Island Ecn

54 Pages Posted: 3 Nov 2008

See all articles by Joel Hasbrouck

Joel Hasbrouck

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance

Gideon Saar

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management; Cornell SC Johnson College of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2001

Abstract

This paper is an empirical analysis of trading activity on the Island ECN, an electronic communications network for US equities, which is organized as an electronic limit order book. The approach is cross-sectional across firms. The goal is to characterize the firm-specific determinants of Island activity, with particular emphasis on the volatility of the firmâ¬"s stock. We find that Islandâ¬"s market share for a given firm is positively related to the overall level of Nasdaq trading in the firm. Across a number of volatility proxies, we find that higher volatility is associated with⬢ a lower proportion of limit orders in the incoming order flow⬢ a higher probability of limit order execution⬢ shorter expected time to execution⬢ lower depth in the book.In addition, we find substantial use of hidden limit orders (for which the submitter has opted to forgo display of the order). Finally, over one quarter of the limit orders submitted to Island are canceled (unexecuted) within two seconds or less. The extensive use of these â¬Sfleetingâ¬? orders is at odds with the view that limit order traders (like dealers) are patient providers of liquidity.

Suggested Citation

Hasbrouck, Joel and Saar, Gideon, Limit Orders and Volatility in a Hybrid Market: The Island Ecn (September 2001). NYU Working Paper No. FIN-01-025, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1294561

Joel Hasbrouck (Contact Author)

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Gideon Saar

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Cornell SC Johnson College of Business ( email )

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