Multilateral Trade Negotiations in the Gatt and the WTO: Lessons for Asia

Asian Economic Papers

Posted: 4 Nov 2008

See all articles by K. C. Fung

K. C. Fung

University of California, Santa Cruz - Department of Economics

Hitomi Iizaka

University of California at Santa Cruz

Chelsea Lin

National Dong Hwa University

Francis Ng

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Date Written: December 2004

Abstract

This paper aims to help Asian trade negotiators by examining the processes and results of the Uruguay Round. Analysts argue that trade negotiations are based on mercantilistic rules. But the actual outcome of the Uruguay Round suggests that trade bargaining was not based on strict reciprocity. In terms of tariff reductions, Asian economies received more than they gave, but relative to tariff bindings, Asian economies gave more than they received. Asian economies that undertook trade reforms prior to the trade talks did not lose bargaining power. The paper also presents econometric evidence on the determinants of bargaining power of nations. Copyright (c) 2005 The Earth Institute at Columbia University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Keywords: Multilateral Negotiations, Trade reforms, Tariff concessions and cuts ,Asia, WTO, GATT

JEL Classification: F10, F13, O5

Suggested Citation

Fung, K. C. and Iizaka, Hitomi and Lin, Chelsea and Ng, Francis, Multilateral Trade Negotiations in the Gatt and the WTO: Lessons for Asia (December 2004). Asian Economic Papers, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1294843

K. C. Fung

University of California, Santa Cruz - Department of Economics ( email )

Santa Cruz, CA 95064
United States
831-459-3273 (Phone)
831-459-5077 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://econ.ucsc.edu/Faculty/facFung.shtml

Hitomi Iizaka

University of California at Santa Cruz ( email )

1156 High St
Santa Cruz, CA 95064
United States
408-476-6645 (Phone)

Chelsea Lin

National Dong Hwa University

No. 1, Sec. 2, Da Hsueh Rd.
Shoufeng, Hualien 97401
Taiwan

Francis Ng (Contact Author)

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-473-8088 (Phone)
202-522-1159 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/fng

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