Managing Expectations

41 Pages Posted: 23 Apr 2007 Last revised: 22 Sep 2010

See all articles by René Lindstädt

René Lindstädt

University of Birmingham

Jeffrey K. Staton

Emory University - Department of Political Science; University of Gothenburg - V-Dem Institute

Date Written: September 20, 2010

Abstract

Followers of law, politics and business commonly relate stories of individuals who appear to predict an expected self-performance level below what they believe likely. Candidates, attorneys and firms sometimes seem to under-predict their own capacities. Insofar as individuals typically construct images of high quality, why do they sometimes do the opposite? The standard explanation is that they are trying to hedge against negative consequences of unanticipated failures and take advantage of unexpected successes. Taken to its logical extreme, the argument suggests that individuals should always manage expectations downward. Quite obviously people do not always undersell their abilities. They often accurately evaluate their own capacities. And of course, some people appear to report quality above what they believe to be true. We develop a model of strategic communication designed to explain this variance. The model suggests empirical implications that may be tested across a number of political, legal and business contexts.

Keywords: Campaigns, Judicial Politics, Public Policy, Political Communication, Expectations, Game Theory, Institutions

JEL Classification: C7, C72, D7, D72, D78, D8, D82, D83, D84, K4, K41

Suggested Citation

Lindstaedt, Rene and Staton, Jeffrey K., Managing Expectations (September 20, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1294913 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1294913

Rene Lindstaedt (Contact Author)

University of Birmingham ( email )

Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT
United Kingdom

Jeffrey K. Staton

Emory University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
404-727-6559 (Phone)
404-727-4586 (Fax)

University of Gothenburg - V-Dem Institute ( email )

United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
180
Abstract Views
1,510
Rank
320,992
PlumX Metrics