Corporate Governance Over the Business Cycle

31 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2008

See all articles by Thomas Philippon

Thomas Philippon

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2003

Abstract

I provide empirical evidence that badly governed firms respond more to aggregate shocks than do well governed firms. I build a simple model where managers are prone to overinvest and where shareholders are more willing to tolerate such a behavior in goodtimes. The model successfully explains the average profit differences as well as thecyclical behavior of sales, employment and investment for firms with different governancequalities. The quantitative results suggest that governance conflicts can explain 30% ofaggregate volatility.

Suggested Citation

Philippon, Thomas, Corporate Governance Over the Business Cycle (July 2003). NYU Working Paper No. S-CG-03-03. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1295251

Thomas Philippon (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
33
Abstract Views
884
PlumX Metrics