A Survey of Stackelberg Differential Game Models in Supply and Marketing Channels: An Erratum

Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering, Vol. 17, No. 2, p. 255, 2008

1 Pages Posted: 5 Nov 2008

See all articles by Xiuli He

Xiuli He

University of North Carolina at Charlotte

Ashutosh Prasad

University of California, Riverside (UCR)

Suresh Sethi

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management

Genaro Gutierrez

University of Texas at Austin - Red McCombs School of Business

Date Written: November 4, 2008

Abstract

The presentation of Table 2 in the original version of this article ("A Survey of Stackelberg Differential Game Models in Supply and Marketing Channels", Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp., 385-413, 2007) contained a few typos. The corrected Table 2 is given below.

Keywords: Stackelberg differential games, supply chain management, marketing channels, open-loop equilibria, feedback policies, channel coordination, optimal control

JEL Classification: M11, M3, C61

Suggested Citation

He, Xiuli and Prasad, Ashutosh and Sethi, Suresh and Gutierrez, Genaro, A Survey of Stackelberg Differential Game Models in Supply and Marketing Channels: An Erratum (November 4, 2008). Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering, Vol. 17, No. 2, p. 255, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1295602

Xiuli He

University of North Carolina at Charlotte ( email )

9201 University City Boulevard
Charlotte, NC 28223
United States

Ashutosh Prasad

University of California, Riverside (UCR)

900 University Avenue
Riverside, CA 92521
United States

Suresh Sethi (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )

800 W. Campbell Road, SM30
Richardson, TX 75080-3021
United States

Genaro Gutierrez

University of Texas at Austin - Red McCombs School of Business ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States

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