The Political Economy of the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis

51 Pages Posted: 11 Nov 2008  

Atif R. Mian

Princeton University - Department of Economics; Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs; NBER

Amir Sufi

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; NBER

Francesco Trebbi

Vancouver School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2008

Abstract

We examine the determinants of congressional voting behavior on two of the most significant pieces of federal legislation in U.S. economic history: the American Housing Rescue and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008 and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. We find evidence that constituent interests and special interests influence voting patterns during the crisis. Representatives from districts experiencing an increase in mortgage default rates are significantly more likely to vote in favor of the AHRFPA. They are precise in responding only to mortgage related constituent defaults, and are significantly more sensitive to defaults of their own-party constituents. Increased campaign contributions from the financial services industry is associated with a higher likelihood of voting in favor of the EESA, a bill which transfers wealth from tax payers to the financial services industry. We also examine the trade-off between politician ideology and constituent and special interests, and find that conservative politicians are less responsive to constituent and special interest pressure. This latter finding suggests that politicians, through ideology, can commit against intervention even during severe crises.

Suggested Citation

Mian, Atif R. and Sufi, Amir and Trebbi, Francesco, The Political Economy of the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis (November 2008). NBER Working Paper No. w14468. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1297698

Atif R. Mian (Contact Author)

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs ( email )

Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

NBER

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Amir Sufi

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

NBER

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Francesco Trebbi

Vancouver School of Economics ( email )

University of British Columbia
6000 Iona Dr.
Vancouver Canada, BC V6T 1L4
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/ftrebbi/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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