Compensation and Top Management Turnover

Mehran, Hamid; Yermack, David

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Compensation and Top Management Turnover

NYU Working Paper No. FIN-98-051

36 Pages Posted: 11 Nov 2008

See all articles by Hamid Mehran

David Yermack

New York University (NYU) - Stern School of Business

Date Written: November 1997

Abstract

An examination of CEO compensation and turnover in 452 large U.S. companies between 1984 and 1991 provides evidence that compensation policies play a significant role in retaining the services of top managers. We find inverse associations between the probability of CEO turnover and the amount by which their compensation is higher than expected. We also find inverse associations between the probability of CEO turnover and the dollar value of stock option compensation in relation to cash pay. The results, which are significant across the entire sample of CEOs, appear stronger for subsamples of CEO departures likely to have been voluntary.

Keywords: Incentives, Compensation, Ownership, Turnover

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Mehran, Hamid and Yermack, David, Compensation and Top Management Turnover (November 1997). NYU Working Paper No. FIN-98-051, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1297755