Compensation and Top Management Turnover
36 Pages Posted: 11 Nov 2008
Date Written: November 1997
Abstract
An examination of CEO compensation and turnover in 452 large U.S. companies between 1984 and 1991 provides evidence that compensation policies play a significant role in retaining the services of top managers. We find inverse associations between the probability of CEO turnover and the amount by which their compensation is higher than expected. We also find inverse associations between the probability of CEO turnover and the dollar value of stock option compensation in relation to cash pay. The results, which are significant across the entire sample of CEOs, appear stronger for subsamples of CEO departures likely to have been voluntary.
Keywords: Incentives, Compensation, Ownership, Turnover
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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