A Sealed-Bid Auction that Matches the English Auction

12 Pages Posted: 29 Oct 1998

See all articles by Elmar Wolfstetter

Elmar Wolfstetter

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics; Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Motty Perry

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality; Pennsylvania State University, College of the Liberal Arts - Department of Economic

Shmuel Zamir

Hebrew University - Center for the Study of Rationality

Date Written: February 2000

Abstract

This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion.

JEL Classification: D44

Suggested Citation

Wolfstetter, Elmar G. and Perry, Motty and Zamir, Shmuel, A Sealed-Bid Auction that Matches the English Auction (February 2000). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 249. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=129789

Elmar G. Wolfstetter (Contact Author)

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie I
Spandauer Strasse 1
Berlin
Germany
+49 30 2093 5652/3 (Phone)
+49 30 2093 5619 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www2.hu-berlin.de/wt1wo/staff/wolfstetter/index.html

Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce ( email )

Anam-dong, Sungbuk-Ku
Seoul, 136-701
Korea

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Motty Perry

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality ( email )

Feldman Building
Givat-Ram
Jerusalem, 91904
Israel

Pennsylvania State University, College of the Liberal Arts - Department of Economic ( email )

524 Kern Graduate Building
University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States

Shmuel Zamir

Hebrew University - Center for the Study of Rationality ( email )

Hebrew University
Jerusalem 91904
Israel
+972 2-6586486 (Phone)

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