Honesty Pays: On the Benefits of Disclosing Information in Coalition Formation

32 Pages Posted: 15 Dec 2008  

Ilja van Beest

University of Amsterdam (UVA), Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences - Communication Science Department

Wolfgang Steinel

Leiden University - Social and Organizational Psychology

J. Keith Murnighan

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Date Written: November 9, 2008

Abstract

Research on deception in negotiation has regularly emphasized the benefits of not disclosing personal information because others may take advantage of those who are honest. In the current study we show that this advice may backfire in distributive multiparty negotiations in which individuals need to form a coalition to obtain payoffs. In Study 1, we show that participants fail to realize that they need to be an attractive coalition partner in order to be included in a coalition. Participants who were able to generate an excess of payoffs were only included in a coalition when all other players also were aware of this advantage. In Study 2 we went one step further and assessed the willingness to disclose information about one's potential earnings. Results showed that fairness motivations mediated the decision to disclose private information about potential earnings, and that those who told the truth made more attractive offers to their fellow coalition players.

Suggested Citation

van Beest, Ilja and Steinel, Wolfgang and Murnighan, J. Keith, Honesty Pays: On the Benefits of Disclosing Information in Coalition Formation (November 9, 2008). IACM 21st Annual Conference Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1298608 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1298608

Ilja Van Beest (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam (UVA), Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences - Communication Science Department ( email )

Kloveniersburgwal 48
Amsterdam, 1012 CX
Netherlands
+31(0)20 525 2110 (Phone)

Wolfgang Steinel

Leiden University - Social and Organizational Psychology ( email )

Leiden, 2300 RA
Netherlands

John Keith Murnighan

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Leverone Hall, 360
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-467-3566 (Phone)
847-491-8896 (Fax)

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