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https://ssrn.com/abstract=1298619
 
 

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Social Motive Expectations and the Concession Timing Effect


Seungwoo Kwon


Korea University Business School (KUBS)

Laurie R. Weingart


Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business

November 9, 2008

IACM 21st Annual Conference Paper

Abstract:     
It has been shown that concession timing can influence a negotiator's satisfaction with and judgment of the negotiation partner, the quality of the object, and the agreed upon price (Kwon & Weingart, 2004). Study 1 tested whether the concession timing effect holds when a negotiator believes the other party is cooperatively oriented. The results suggest that a negotiator's belief about the other party's cooperative social motive overrides the concession timing effect. Specifically, if the other party was believed to be cooperative, negotiators did not feel dissatisfied with the outcome or the negotiating partner and did not evaluate the value of the object as being low, even when the other party made early concessions. Study 2 examined the interaction effects of concession timing and cooperative expectations in a more general setting (i.e., a negotiation between friends or between strangers) and investigated the mechanisms through which cooperative expectations override the concession timing effect. Results showed that trust between negotiators and negotiation scripts both played a role.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30


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Date posted: November 11, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Kwon, Seungwoo and Weingart, Laurie R., Social Motive Expectations and the Concession Timing Effect (November 9, 2008). IACM 21st Annual Conference Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1298619 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1298619

Contact Information

Seungwoo Kwon (Contact Author)
Korea University Business School (KUBS) ( email )
Anam-Dong, Seongbuk-Gu
Seoul 136-701, 136701
Korea
HOME PAGE: http://biz.korea.ac.kr/professor/winwin
Laurie R. Weingart
Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business ( email )
236A Posner Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
412-268-7585 (Phone)
412-268-6920 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.gsia.cmu.edu/andrew/weingart

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