Does the Disclosure of Corporate Governance Structures Affect the Market Valuation of Earnings Surprises and Firms’ Earnings Management?

53 Pages Posted: 12 Nov 2008 Last revised: 10 Feb 2010

See all articles by Jui-Chin Chang

Jui-Chin Chang

Texas A&M International University

Huey-Lian Sun

Morgan State University - Department of Accounting and Finance

Date Written: February 8, 2010

Abstract

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) mandated a variety of corporate governance mechanisms to improve the transparency of financial reporting quality. We investigate whether SOX’s recently mandated disclosure of corporate governance structures affects the market’s perception of earnings informativeness and firms’ earnings management. We find that the market valuation of earnings surprises is significantly higher for firms disclosing stronger corporate governance functions. We also find that the effectiveness of corporate governance in monitoring earnings management is improved after the mandated disclosure. Specifically, the empirical evidence shows that the informativeness of accounting earnings increases after the SOX’s mandated disclosure which strengthens the link between financial reporting and corporate governance functions.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Earnings Informativeness, Earnings Management, SOX

JEL Classification: C12, C21, C80, G38

Suggested Citation

Chang, Jui-Chin and Sun, Huey-Lian, Does the Disclosure of Corporate Governance Structures Affect the Market Valuation of Earnings Surprises and Firms’ Earnings Management? (February 8, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1299221 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1299221

Jui-Chin Chang (Contact Author)

Texas A&M International University ( email )

Texas
United States
956-326-2501 (Phone)

Huey-Lian Sun

Morgan State University - Department of Accounting and Finance ( email )

Baltimore, MD 21251
United States
443-885-3971 (Phone)
410-319-3721 (Fax)

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