Centralization, Decentralization, and Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa

45 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Mehmet Serkan Tosun

Mehmet Serkan Tosun

University of Nevada, Reno - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Serdar Yilmaz

World Bank

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 1, 2008

Abstract

This paper examines broadly the intergovernmental structure in the Middle East and North Africa region, which has one of the most centralized government structures in the world. The authors address the reasons behind this centralized structure by looking first at the history behind the tax systems of the region. They review the Ottoman taxation system, which has been predominantly influential as a model, and discuss its impact on current government structure. They also discuss the current intergovernmental structure by examining the type and degree of decentralization in five countries representative of the region: Egypt, Iran, West Bank/Gaza, Tunisia, and Yemen. Cross-country regression analysis using panel data for a broader set of countries leads to better understanding of the factors behind heavy centralization in the region. The findings show that external conflicts constitute a major roadblock to decentralization in the region.

Keywords: Banks & Banking Reform, Public Sector Expenditure Analysis & Management, Municipal Financial Management, Public Sector Economics & Finance, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Local Finance Management

Suggested Citation

Tosun, Mehmet Serkan and Yilmaz, Serdar, Centralization, Decentralization, and Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa (November 1, 2008). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4774, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1300269

Mehmet Serkan Tosun (Contact Author)

University of Nevada, Reno - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.coba.unr.edu/econ/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Serdar Yilmaz

World Bank ( email )

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Washington, DC 20433
United States

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