Networking as a Barrier to Entry and the Competitive Supply of Venture Capital

48 Pages Posted: 13 Nov 2008

See all articles by Yael V. Hochberg

Yael V. Hochberg

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Rice University - Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business

Alexander Ljungqvist

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Swedish House of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2007

Abstract

We examine whether networks among incumbent venture capital firms help restrict entryinto local VC markets in the U.S., thus improving VCs bargaining power over entrepreneurs. We show that VC markets with more extensive networking among the incumbent players experience less entry. The effect is sizeable economically and appears robust to plausible endogeneity concerns. Entry is accommodated if the entrant has established relationships with a target-market incumbent in its own home market. In turn, incumbents react strategically to an increased threat of entry, in the sense that they freeze out any incumbent that builds a relationship with a potential entrant. Finally, companies seeking venture capital raise money on worse terms in more densely networked markets while increased entry is associated with higher valuations.

Keywords: Venture Capital, Start-up Financing, Networks, Syndication, Barriers to Entry, Entry Deterrence

Suggested Citation

Hochberg, Yael V. and Ljungqvist, Alexander and Ljungqvist, Alexander, Networking as a Barrier to Entry and the Competitive Supply of Venture Capital (March 2007). NYU Working Paper No. FIN-06-005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1300763

Yael V. Hochberg (Contact Author)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Rice University - Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business ( email )

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Alexander Ljungqvist

Swedish House of Finance ( email )

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Sweden

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
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1000 Brussels
Belgium

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