54 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2008 Last revised: 2 Jul 2014
Date Written: November 12, 2008
This paper examines how employees trade off planned activities versus unplanned innovation, and how firms can choose incentives to affect these choices. It develops a multi-task model where employees makes choices between their assigned standard tasks, for which the firm has a performance measure and provides incentives, and privately observed innovation opportunities that fall outside of the performance metrics, and require ex-post bargaining. The model shows how firms adapt incentive compensations in the presence of such unplanned innovation. If innovation are highly firm-specific, firms provide lower-powered incentives for standard tasks to encourage more innovation, yet in equilibrium employees undertake too few innovation. The opposite occurs if innovation are less firm-specific. We also investigate the effectiveness of several possibilities to encourage innovation, such as tolerance for failure, investing in employee innovation, stock-based compensation, and the allocation of intellectual property rights.
Keywords: Innovation, multi-tasking, incentives
JEL Classification: D82, D86, M52
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Hellmann, Thomas F. and Thiele, Veikko, Incentives and Innovation: A Multi-Tasking Approach (November 12, 2008). Queen's School of Business Research Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1301712 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1301712