Beetles, Frogs, and Lawyers: The Scientific Demarcation Problem in the Gilson Theory of Value Creation

11 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2008 Last revised: 11 Aug 2009

Jeffrey M. Lipshaw

Suffolk University Law School

Date Written: December 10, 2008

Abstract

Recently, Ronald Gilson described a transactional lawyer turned law professor as someone who was a beetle, but became an entomologist. This is not the first non-mammalian metaphor used by an economically inclined legal academic to demarcate those who study and those who are studied. As Richard Posner so colorfully explained rational actors as they appear to economists studying them objectively: "it would not be a solecism to speak of a rational frog." In this short essay, I suggest that both say something about the prevailing view of theorizing that is entitled to privileged epistemic status in the legal academy. Some economic explanations of the activities of beetles, frogs, and lawyers are entitled to this status, and some are not. I assess Professor Gilson's classic 1984 article on value creation by lawyers in terms of its implicit claims to (social) scientific knowledge, and conclude that it is not.

Keywords: transaction cost engineers, rational actor, law and economics, Gilson, philosophy of science, falsification, Popper, demarcation

JEL Classification: B21, K40

Suggested Citation

Lipshaw, Jeffrey M., Beetles, Frogs, and Lawyers: The Scientific Demarcation Problem in the Gilson Theory of Value Creation (December 10, 2008). Willamette Law Review, Forthcoming; Suffolk University Law School Research Paper No. 08-38. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1303483 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1303483

Jeffrey M. Lipshaw (Contact Author)

Suffolk University Law School ( email )

120 Tremont Street
Boston, MA 02108-4977
United States

HOME PAGE: http://ssrn.com/author=381790

Paper statistics

Downloads
179
Rank
136,283
Abstract Views
1,909