The Economic Determinants of Conditional Conservatism

60 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2008

See all articles by Juan M. García Lara

Juan M. García Lara

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Business Administration

Beatriz Garcia Osma

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Business Administration

Fernando Penalva

IESE Business School - University of Navarra

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 18, 2008

Abstract

We study the economic determinants of conditional conservatism. Consistent with prior literature, we find that contracting induces only conditional conservatism and litigation induces both conditional and unconditional conservatism. We extend prior evidence by Qiang (2007) by showing that taxation and regulation induce not only unconditional conservatism, but conditional conservatism as well. We show that in certain scenarios taxation and regulation create incentives to shift income from periods with high taxation pressure and high public scrutiny to periods with lower taxation pressure and lower public scrutiny. These income shifting strategies are implemented by recognising current economic losses that, given managerial incentives to report aggressively, would not have been recognised otherwise, or by delaying the recognition of current economic gains that would have been recognised had circumstances been different.

Keywords: Conservatism, contracting, taxation, political costs, litigation risk

JEL Classification: M41, M44, D82, G38, H25, H32

Suggested Citation

García Lara, Juan Manuel and Garcia Osma, Beatriz and Penalva, Fernando, The Economic Determinants of Conditional Conservatism (November 18, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1303525 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1303525

Juan Manuel García Lara

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Business Administration ( email )

Calle Madrid 126
Getafe, Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain

Beatriz Garcia Osma

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Business Administration ( email )

Calle Madrid 126
Getafe, Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain

Fernando Penalva (Contact Author)

IESE Business School - University of Navarra ( email )

Ave. Pearson 21
Barcelona, Barcelona 08034
Spain
932534200 (Phone)
932534343 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.iese.edu

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
415
Abstract Views
4,252
rank
70,537
PlumX Metrics