Does Competition from Ambulatory Surgical Centers Affect Hospital Surgical Output and Hospital Profit?

38 Pages Posted: 26 Nov 2008 Last revised: 4 Jun 2009

See all articles by Michael Robert Plotzke

Michael Robert Plotzke

Abt Associates Inc.

Charles Courtemanche

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Greensboro - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 3, 2009

Abstract

Hospital administrators have expressed concern that ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs) lower the profitability of hospitals’ outpatient departments by reducing their volume and cherry picking their most profitable patients. This could lead to welfare losses by causing hospitals to reduce their provision of less profitable services such as uncompensated care. This paper estimates the effects of ASC prevalence on hospital surgical volume and profit margins using hospital and year fixed effects models with a variety of robustness checks. We show that ASC entry only appears to influence a hospital’s outpatient volume if the facilities are within a few miles of each other. Even then, the average reduction in hospital volume is a modest 2-4%, although the effect is stronger for large ASCs and the first ASCs to enter the market. We find no evidence that entering ASCs reduce a hospital’s outpatient profit margins, inpatient surgical volume, or inpatient profit margins. In most cases, our results suggest that competition from ASCs does not cause serious financial harm to hospitals.

Keywords: Ambulatory Surgical Center, Ambualtory Surgery Center, Hospital Competition, Physician Ownership, Hospital Profit

JEL Classification: I11

Suggested Citation

Plotzke, Michael Robert and Courtemanche, Charles, Does Competition from Ambulatory Surgical Centers Affect Hospital Surgical Output and Hospital Profit? (June 3, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1306571 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1306571

Michael Robert Plotzke (Contact Author)

Abt Associates Inc. ( email )

55 Wheeler St.
Cambridge, MA 02138-1168
United States

Charles Courtemanche

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Greensboro - Department of Economics ( email )

Greensboro, NC 27402-6165
United States

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