Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Non Linear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance

50 Pages Posted: 2 Dec 2008

See all articles by Celine Bonnet

Celine Bonnet

GREMAQ, INRA

Pierre Dubois

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Date Written: July 2008

Abstract

A methodology is presented allowing manufacturers and retailers vertical contracting in their pricing strategies on a differentiated product market to be introduced. This contribution allows price-cost margins to be recovered from estimates of demand parameters both under linear pricing models and two part tariffs. Two types of nonlinear pricing relationships, one where resale price maintenance is used with two part tariffs contracts and one where no resale price maintenance is allowed in two part tariff contracts in particular are considered. The methodology then allows different hypotheses on contracting and pricing relationships between manufacturers and retailers in the supermarket industry to be tested using exogenous variables supposed to shift the marginal costs of production and distribution. This method is applied empirically to study the retail market bottled water in France. Our empirical evidence shows that manufacturers and retailers use nonlinear pricing contracts and in particular two part tariff contracts with resale price maintenance. Finally, using the estimation of our structural model, some simulations of counterfactual policy experiments are introduced.

Keywords: collusion, competition, differentiated products, double marginalization, manufacturers, non nested tests, retailers, two part tariffs, vertical contracts, water

JEL Classification: C12, C33, L13, L81

Suggested Citation

Bonnet, Celine and Dubois, Pierre, Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Non Linear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance (July 2008). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6918. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1307508

Celine Bonnet (Contact Author)

GREMAQ, INRA ( email )

Place Anatole France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

Pierre Dubois

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

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