The Transparency and Credibility of the European Central Bank

Posted: 27 Nov 2008 Last revised: 3 Oct 2011

See all articles by Jakob de Haan

Jakob de Haan

University of Groningen - Faculty of Economics and Business; De Nederlandsche Bank; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Fabian Amtenbrink

Erasmus University Rotterdam - Erasmus School of Law

Sandra Waller

Bayerische Landesbank

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 26, 2008

Abstract

The European Central Bank (ECB) ranks highly on the author's proposed central bank disclosure inidcator, measuring activities of central banks to enhance the public's understanding of their policies. Nevertheless, the survey evidence offered in this contribution suggests that private-sector economists do not consider the ECB transparent. The authors argue that this may be caused by the quality of the information provided by the ECB. In addition, the way intermediaries report on the ECB may influence the public's perceptions. The ECB also does not rank highly in terms of credibility; still, most ECB policy decisions analysed in this contribution were found to be in line with financial markets' expectations.

Keywords: European Law, European Central Bank, transparency, credibility, monetary policy, intermediaries, disclosure, monetary policy strategy

JEL Classification: K10, K29, L51, E52, E58

Suggested Citation

de Haan, Jakob and Amtenbrink, Fabian and Waller, Sandra, The Transparency and Credibility of the European Central Bank (November 26, 2008). Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 42, No. 4, pp. 775-794, November 2004, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1307624

Jakob De Haan

University of Groningen - Faculty of Economics and Business ( email )

PO Box 800
Groningen, 9700 AV
Netherlands
+31 0 50 3633706 (Fax)

De Nederlandsche Bank ( email )

P.O. Box 98
Amsterdam, 1000 AB
Netherlands

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Fabian Amtenbrink (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam - Erasmus School of Law ( email )

3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
+31104081573 (Phone)

Sandra Waller

Bayerische Landesbank ( email )

Brienner Strasse 18
80333 Munich
Germany

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