54 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2008 Last revised: 13 Apr 2009
Date Written: November 28, 2008
Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism which allows students to influence how they are treated in ties. It maintains truthful revelation of ordinal preferences and supports a greater scope of efficiency.
Keywords: Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm, choice-augmented deferred acceptance, tie breaking, ex ante Pareto efficiency
JEL Classification: C72, C78, D61, D78, I20
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila and Che, Yeon-Koo and Yasuda, Yosuke, Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice (November 28, 2008). Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Research Paper No. 20. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1308730 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1308730