Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Che, Yeon-Koo; Yasuda, Yosuke

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1308730

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Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice

Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Research Paper No. 20

54 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2008 Last revised: 13 Apr 2009

See all articles by Atila Abdulkadiroglu

Atila Abdulkadiroglu

Duke University - Department of Economics

Yosuke Yasuda

Osaka University - Graduate School of Economics

Date Written: November 28, 2008

Abstract

Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism which allows students to influence how they are treated in ties. It maintains truthful revelation of ordinal preferences and supports a greater scope of efficiency.

Keywords: Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm, choice-augmented deferred acceptance, tie breaking, ex ante Pareto efficiency

JEL Classification: C72, C78, D61, D78, I20

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila and Che, Yeon-Koo and Yasuda, Yosuke, Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice (November 28, 2008). Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Research Paper No. 20, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1308730 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1308730